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NO-FAULT COMPENSATION AND UNLOCKING TORT LAW’S 
“RECIPROCAL NORMATIVE EMBRACE”
Jesse W all*
The purpose o f  this article is to explain how the principle o f  corrective justice has 
been displaced by the provision o f no-fault compensation for personal injuries.
In explaining the transition fivm  tort liability fo r personal injuries to no-fault 
compensation, the aim is to identify the norms that are adhered to, and the norms 
that are abandoned, under either scheme. The explanation unfolds through three 
sections. Section 2 examines the principled basis fo r a no-fault compensation 
scheme that is formulated in the Woodhouse Report. Section 3 then turns to consider 
how, in the absence o f  a no-fault compensation scheme, the principle o f  corrective 
justice imposes an agent-relative duty o f reparation on those responsible for 
causing a wrongful loss. Section 4 then considers how the duty o f reparation can be 
discharged by a third party when we reconfigure our conception o f  “wrongful loss ’’ 
and considers the implications o f the reconfiguration for the fault principle. Viewing 
the transition from tort law actions to no-fault compensation in this way enables us 
to appreciate how a “normatively significant connection between actions and their 
outcomes ” is severed through the reconfiguration o f “wrongful loss ”.
1. Introduction
Before long, the 50th anniversary of the Woodhouse Report will be upon us.* 1 The 
Woodhouse Report, and the subsequent statutory scheme for the compensation of 
personal injuries on a no-fault basis that the Report led to, is a much-celebrated 
component of the New Zealand legal system.2 As a result of the statutory scheme, 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer suggests, “the corrective justice analysis that an individual 
whose autonomy has been invaded ought to have it restored and paid for by the 
person who caused it holds no sway” in the minds of New Zealand people.3 This 
may be true, in which case the normative force of the principle of corrective 
justice has somehow been displaced. An explanation is therefore required of 
how the principle of corrective justice has been displaced by the provision of 
no-fault compensation for personal injuries.
The purpose of this article is to provide such an explanation. There are a 
number of simple explanations that could be provided; “by legislation” is one 
simple response; “by the principle of distributive justice” is another. Here, I am 
concerned with providing a further explanation. I will suggest that the principle 
of corrective justice can be displaced when we reconfigure a “loss” that a person 
suffers as wrongful vis-a-vis the community-at-large rather than a loss that is 
wrongful vis-a-vis a person’s wrongdoing. No-fault compensation schemes 
are therefore concerned with losses that are “wrongful” as measured against a
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1 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation fo r  Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f  the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967).
2 Accident Compensation Act 2001.
3 Geoffrey Palmer “New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years On” (1994) 
44 UTLJ 223 at 247.
126 New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol 27
standard of “wrongfulness” that is independent of any actions that caused the 
loss. This is also a simplistic answer (that invites even further explanation). 
However, viewing the transition from tort law actions to no-fault compensation 
in this way enables us to appreciate how a “normatively significant connection 
between actions and their outcomes” is severed through the reconfiguration of 
“wrongful loss”.4
Moreover, this simplistic answer is nonetheless sophisticated enough to 
engage in two related debates. On one front, I argue that the Woodhouse Report 
was mistaken in its criticism of “the fault principle”. The Report argues that the 
underlying philosophy of tort law actions is “illogical”, and such defects motivate 
the move away from tort law actions towards a statutory no-fault compensation 
scheme for personal injuries.51 contend here that, although our move away from 
tort law actions as the remedial response to wrongfully-occasioned personal 
injuries may be sensible (and even praiseworthy) all things considered, it is 
nonetheless at the expense of sound principles of tort law. This contention opens 
up a second front to defend: the view that no-fault compensation schemes are 
pursuant to a principle of distributive justice that comes at the expense of the 
principle of corrective justice. This is the “abandonment view” that has recently 
been subject to criticism.6 By mapping the transition from tort liability for 
personal injuries to no-fault compensation this article aims to identify the norms 
that are adhered to, and the norms that are abandoned, under either scheme. 
It is then possible to appreciate the contrast between the schemes in clearer 
philosophical terms.
This argument unfolds through three sections. Section 2 examines the 
principled basis for a no-fault compensation scheme that is fonnulated in the 
Woodhouse Report. From this examination we can identify the discarded norms 
of objective duties and outcome responsibility. Section 3 then turns to consider 
how, in the absence of a no-fault compensation scheme, the principle of corrective 
justice imposes an agent-relative duty of reparation on those responsible for 
causing a wrongful loss. Section 4 then considers how the duty of reparation can 
be discharged by a third party when we reconfigure our conception of “wrongful 
loss” and considers the implications of the reconfiguration for the norms of 
objective and outcome responsibility.
So, before the Law Commission retrieves its bunting from storage, and 
before we heap praise on the Woodhouse Report and our scheme for accident 
compensation, let us first return to the recommendations in the Report and then 
allow me to momentarily revive the idea of corrective justice.
4 Stephen R Perry “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law” 77 Iowa L Rev (1992) 449 at 497.
5 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation fo r Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f  the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
( December 1967) at [78]: “There are four principal criticisms of the common law action. They 
describe the philosophy upon which it depends as illogical, the verdicts as entirely uncertain 
and affected by mere chance, the procedure as costly and slow moving, and the nature of the 
award and the whole process as an impediment to rehabilitation”.
6 S Connell “Justice for Victims of Injury: The Influence ofNew Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
Scheme on the Civil and Criminal Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 181 at 181: “Abolishing damages 
for personal injury and replacing them with the redistributive ACC scheme was a significant 
step in the pursuit of distributive justice. The orthodox view is that the introduction of ACC 
was an abandonment of corrective and retributive justice in favour of distributive justice. I will 
argue that the law continues to pursue corrective and retributive justice for injury victims”. 
Note: ACC is the New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation.
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2. The Woodhouse Report
To start, consider a series of basic private law scenarios:
(1) Dp through his own poor note-keeping, publishes an untrue statement in 
a newspaper column about Pt that damages P,’s reputation.
(2) D2, through the use of novel but defective materials, insulates P2’s home 
in a way that traps moisture, thereby damaging the timber framing of 
P2’s home.
(3) D3, by being momentarily distracted whilst driving, damages P3’s 
bicycle beyond repair.
(4) D4, through his own poor note-keeping, performs a sterilisation 
procedure on P4, erroneously believing that it was one of a number of 
procedures sought by P4.
(5) D., through the use of novel but defective materials, insulates P5’s home 
in a way that (as a specific series of events) allows airborne insulation 
fibres to cause P. to suffer a respiratory disease.
(6) D6, by being momentarily distracted whilst driving, seriously injures a 
cyclist, P6.
In New Zealand, D4 D5 and D6 are treated differently from D] D2 and D,. 
Under a no-fault compensation scheme for personal injuries occasioned by 
accident, the costs of P4’s, P5’s, and P6’s physical recovery would be covered by 
the compensation scheme.7 As a corollary, P4, P5, and P6 are unable to bring an 
action in tort law against D4, D5 and D6.8 In comparison, actions for defamation 
and negligence would be available to P,, P2, and P3 for them to claim damages 
against Dp D2, and D3.
The no-fault compensation scheme originates from the recommendations 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in 
New Zealand that were published in the Woodhouse Report. The Report 
recommended a scheme that:9
... would provide immediate compensation without proof of fault for every
injured person, regardless of his or her fault, and whether the accident occurred
in the factory, on the highway, or in the home.
This recommendation is based upon a combination of discontent with the 
existing tort law actions for personal injury as well as a zeal for extending the 
existing statutory system of workplace injury insurance to every citizen who 
suffers a personal injury. The reasoning that informs The Report’s discontent and 
zeal is multi-faceted.10 Here, I wish to focus on the moral principles that underlie 
both tort law actions and the statutory compensation schemes (leaving aside for 
now the other facets of the Woodhouse Report and the other possible rationales 
for no-fault compensation schemes).
7 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 20.
8 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s 317.
9 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation fo r  Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f  the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [18],
10 The facets include moral precepts of justice and equity, the economic analysis of the cost of 
personal injuries, findings on the administrative and procedural efficiencies of systems of 
compensation, and analyses of injury prevention and recovery.
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According to the Woodhouse Report, the first and fundamental principle is 
that o f community responsibility.11 The principle is premised upon two norms. 
The first is a reciprocity norm:12
Just as modern society benefits from the productive work of its citizens, so 
should society accept responsibility for those willing to work but prevented from 
doing so by physical incapacity.
The contention is that, to the extent that the community benefits from a 
productive work force, the community ought to reciprocate by absorbing the 
disbenefit o f physical incapacity in the work force.
The second stage of the argument then advances a broader risk-distribution 
norm:13
... since we all persist in following community activities, which year by year, 
exact a predictable and inevitable price in bodily injury, so should we all share 
in sustaining those who become the random but statistically necessary victims.
This further contention is subtly different: given that we all engage in 
“community activities”, and given that these activities raise a risk o f personal 
injury, we ought to distribute the cost o f the risk materialising equally throughout 
the participants in community activities.
The Woodhouse Report’s principle o f community responsibility rests “on a 
double argument” since the “ought” (italicised above) in the risk-distribution 
nonn is otherwise unsupported unless we derive the “ought” from the reciprocity 
norm.14 In other words, the reason why we ought to distribute the costs to the 
community-at-large (rather than letting the costs fall as they may on individual 
participants in these activities) is because o f the reciprocity norm (i.e. because 
the community benefits from the participation in these activities).
We can see the two nonns o f the community responsibility principle being 
woven together in Sir Owen Woodhouse’s later description o f the principle:15
... society itself... has built up and encouraged the heavily risk-laden activities 
that exact a known and expected cost in life and limb ... it [is] imperative that we 
all should share in the burden that falls in so random a way upon those who do 
become the casualties.
The community responsibility principle therefore provides that, since society 
encourages, and derives utility from, risk-laden activities, and since risk-laden 
activities impose a random burden on some o f the participants in the activities,
11 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Persona/ Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
(December 1967) at [56],
12 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [56],
13 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [56],
14 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [56],
15 Owen Woodhouse “Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme” [1979] NZLJ 395, at 396.
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society ought to account for the burden by compensating the injuries suffered in 
the course of risk-laden activities.
The Report therefore views personal injuries occasioned by accidents as 
raising a question of distributive justice: given that there are benefits and burdens 
that arise from a set of activities, and given that the burdens (in particular) 
can rest on several different bearers, how should these burdens be allocated 
between the potential set of bearers?16 According to the Woodhouse Report, it 
is the “community” that “must protect all citizens ... from the burden of sudden 
individual loss”.17
The alternative is to view personal injuries as either being wrongfully 
occasioned or occasioned without fault. Wrongfully-occasioned personal 
injuries engage a norm of corrective justice (and the losses from personal 
injuries occasioned without fault are left to fall where they may). In terms of 
wrongfully-occasioned personal injuries, between the person who caused the 
loss through his or her wrongdoing (D) and the person who suffers from the 
loss (P), “one of them has certain goods or ills from, or lost certain good or ills 
to, the other”.18 Corrective justice requires an arithmetic correction through the 
addition or subtraction of gains or losses as between the two parties, with the 
aim of correcting the normative inequality between them that the wrongdoing 
occasioned.
In order to bring the two parties (P and D), and only the two parties, into 
the arithmetic equation, it is necessary to find fault or wrongdoing (in order to 
identify D) and identify a connected wrongful loss (in order to identify P). “The 
fault principle”, simply put, provides that D’s fault or wrongful conduct provides 
the basis for holding D responsible for the losses suffered by P that resulted from 
D’s conduct.
In response to the fault principle in tort law actions, the Woodhouse Report 
advanced two principled objections. The first objection concerned the objective 
standard of fault-based liability. According to the Report:19
... the moral basis for the application of the fault principle cannot be explained
in terms of the legal conception of negligence because the test for negligence is
objective and impersonal.
A finding of fault only requires an objective assessment of the conduct of 
D. Hence, D)} D, ... D6 are all at fault in the sense that their conduct fell below
16 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L & Phil 1 at 9: “Norms of distributive justice are to be understood on the ‘geometric’ model of 
division. There are several potential holders of certain goods or ills and the question is how to 
divide the good or ills up among them” citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [1131b 12-15).
17 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [55].
18 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L & Phil 1 at 9: “Norms of corrective justice ... are to be understood on the ‘arithmetic’ model 
of addition and subtraction. Only two potential holders are in play at a time. One of them has 
gained certain goods or ills from, or lost certain goods or ills to, the other. The question is 
whether and how the transaction should be reversed, undone, counteracted” citing Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics [1132a 1-6).
19 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for PersonaI Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
(December 1967) at [82].
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what we reasonably expect from journalists, insulators, drivers, or surgeons. The 
Woodhouse Report was concerned that “[njegligence is tested not in terms of 
the state of mind or attitude of the actual defendant, but impersonally against 
the ... performance of a theoretical individual”20 and unless conduct “reflects a 
subjective and moral attitude” it “can hardly deserve moral censure”.21 Hence, 
according to the Woodhouse Report, “it is really not possible to equate negligence 
as an independent tort with moral blameworthiness”.22
Yet, an objective finding of fault does not purport to also identify instances 
of moral blameworthiness; conduct that is wrongful (with regards to an objective 
standard) does not necessarily attract moral censure. As MacCormick explains:23
... every person has a right to be secure from harm to person or possessions caused 
by any lapse from a reasonable standard of care and attentiveness on the part of 
any other person. To respect such a right entails acceptance that an obligation of 
reparation is incumbent on a person responsible for an infringement of another’s 
right, regardless of his being morally at fault or blameworthy in the matter.
Rather than attracting moral censure, a finding of fault attracts a duty or 
“obligation of reparation”. It is because D deviated from an objective standard 
of conduct that infringed a right of P, D is responsible for P’s losses and ought 
to repair or correct P's loss. If D does not correct the loss, perhaps then he 
would be morally blameworthy and culpable,24 but the mere “existence of an 
obligation of reparation is not necessarily conditional upon [moral] fault or 
blameworthiness” of D.25 Careless note-taking, the use of defective materials, or 
moments of inattention whilst driving, are instances of fault or wrongdoing by D. 
If we limit ourselves to assessing objectively the conduct of D, the Woodhouse 
Report is correct that we cannot unilaterally equate D's conduct with moral 
blameworthiness. We can, nonetheless, say that D’s wrongdoing has normative 
consequences in the form of a duty or obligation of reparation. Hence, we can 
explain the “moral basis for the application of the fault principle” in terms of 
P’s “right to be secure from harm to person or possessions caused by any lapse 
from a reasonable standard of care and attentiveness”. We do not need to allocate 
moral blame upon, or direct moral censure toward, D.
More fundamentally, there is a distinction between “doing the wrong thing” 
and “doing something wrongful”; a distinction that “is of pervasive importance
20 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
(December 1967) at [87].
21 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [88].
22 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Persona! Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
(December 1967) at [87].
23 D N MacCormick “The Obligation of Reparation” (1978) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 175 at 183 [emphasis added],
24 D N MacCormick “The Obligation of Reparation” (1978) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 175 at 176: “to say that there is an obligation of reparation is to imply that it would be 
blameworthy [conduct] if [the obligation was] subsequently ... refused or neglected”.
25 D N MacCormick “The Obligation of Reparation” (1978) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 175 at 176: “fault or blame in the moral sense are not conditions of the obligation of 
reparation”.
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in most developed legal systems”.26 “Wrongdoing”, “doing something 
wrongful”, “or acting wrongfully”, Gardner explains, “is the breach of a duty, 
and a duty ... is a reason with doubly special categorical and mandatory force”.27 
In comparison, “to do the wrong thing” is to do something unjustifiable (that is, 
contrary to reasons for action, all things considered). It is possible, therefore, 
to do something wrongful (breach a duty) without doing a wrong thing (act 
unjustifiably) since the breach of duty may be excusable, justifiable or defeasible, 
all things considered.
The fault principle merely provides an objective standard of conduct. 
Although a failure to live up to this standard is wrongful (a breach of duty), 
and has normative consequences in the form of the duty of reparation, the 
fault principle does not identify whether the action (that was in breach of the 
duty) was the wrong thing to do. Since' the fault principle is concerned with 
reparation rather than the moral culpability, it is not a valid criticism of the fault 
principle that the objective assessment of conduct cannot be equated with moral 
blameworthiness.28
The Woodhouse Report’s second objection to the fault principle is that:29
The extent of liability is not measured by the quality of the defendant’s conduct, 
but by its results. Reprehensible conduct can be followed by feather blows while 
a moment’s inadvertence could call down the heavens.
This objection touches upon a characteristic common to questions of moral 
responsibility and legal liability. That is, given that we are held responsible for 
the consequences of our conduct (to a particular extent, see below), and given 
that the consequences of our conduct are informed by factors beyond our control, 
it then follows that our responsibility is adjudged with reference to some factors 
that are beyond our control. For instance, D, damaged a bicycle beyond repair. 
Because of D3’s wrongdoing, D, is responsible and liable for the loss suffered by 
P,. The same moment of inattention whilst driving can fortuitously cause no loss 
at all, or attract responsibility for vastly different amounts of loss (since the value 
of the bicycle could range from priceless to worthless).30 The more complex the 
scenario, the greater variation in outcomes that D may be held to be responsible 
for. For instance, D, was unable to control the unseasonably wet winter that 
aggravated the defect in the insulation method, nor was D2 able to control the
26 John Gardner “Wrongs and Faults” in AP Simester (ed) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005) 51 at 55.
27 John Gardner “Wrongs and Faults” in AP Simester (ed) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005) 51 at 55-57.
28 Compare S Connell “Justice for Victims of Injury: The Influence of New Zealand’s Accident 
Compensation Scheme on the Civil and Criminal Law” (2012) 25 NZULR 181 at 185: “The 
introduction and expansion of the tort of negligence allowed the common law to provide 
compensation to an increasing proportion of injury victims, at the cost of its corrective justice 
credentials. The objective standard of care meant that defendants could be held responsible for 
inadvertent acts or omissions which can be challenging to describe as moral wrongdoing” and 
at 192: “the law oftorts is concerned to some extent with responding to wrongdoing: punishing 
wrongdoers, deterring wrongful conduct, marking society’s disapproval and so on”.
29 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission ofInquiry 
(December 1967) at [85],
30 See Jeremy Waldron “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss” in David G Owen (ed) The 
Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 387.
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extent to which the damage to the framing caused a series of further defects 
to the building, and so on. Nonetheless, such outcomes provide the basis upon 
which we assess and measure D2’s and D3’s responsibility for acting wrongfully.
The Woodhouse Report is concerned that damages under the fault principle 
can ‘'become disproportionate to the conduct which is said to justify them”.31 
Instead of the extent of D’s liability being determined by D’s blameworthiness 
or culpability (because of the objective assessment of fault), the extent of D’s 
liability is informed by the combination of wrongful conduct and factors beyond 
D’s control. The extent of D’s liability comes down, in part, to “luck”.
A lot can be said about this apparent problem. Here, I will limit myself to 
two and a half brief points (that have all been developed elsewhere).32 First, 
as a preliminary point, consider how the focus of the law is on the negative 
consequences of actions.33 This leaves us with an incomplete overall evaluative 
picture. If every action embodies a risk (insofar as our actions engage factors that 
are outside of our agency that nonetheless inform the outcome of our actions) 
then an action may have positive consequences that the agent D is responsible 
for (can take credit for) despite some causal factors being outside of the agent’s 
control. For instance, D3 or D4 may benefit from the reputation of being an 
efficient and industrious professional who does not “get tied up with paper 
work and excessive note taking”, D3 or D6 may benefit from arriving at their 
destination on time after overtaking a slow-moving cyclist, D or D3 may profit 
from the reduced costs of their innovative insulation material. If  we stand by the 
objection that D should not be held responsible for the negative consequences of 
D’s actions that are informed by factors that are outside of D’s agency, then we 
should equally refuse to credit D with the positive consequences of D's actions 
that are infonned by factors that are outside of D’s agency.
Second, and more fundamentally, if we are unwilling to hold D responsible 
for the negative consequences of D’s actions that are informed by factors 
that are outside of D’s agency, then our ability to legally adjudge or morally 
appraise D’s conduct begins to dissolve entirely. That is, if we subtract away 
every eventuality that follows from an action (because it is tainted by factors 
external to D’s agency) and if we subtract away every component part of an 
action (since that too can be tainted by external factors), then we have removed 
D’s agency from the equation. As Nagel argues, “the area of genuine agency, 
and therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems to shrink under this scrutiny
31 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry 
(December 1967) at [85].
32 B Williams and T Nagel “Moral Luck” (1976) 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 115; Jeremy Waldron “Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss” 
in David G Owen (ed) The Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1997) 387; AM Honore “Responsibility and Luck: the Moral Basis of Strict Liability” 
(1988) 104 LQR 530; John Gardner “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter 
Cane and John Gardner (eds) Relating to Responsibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) 111.
33 AM Honore “Responsibility and Luck: the Moral Basis of Strict Liability” (1988) 104 LQR 
530 at 106-111; John Gardner “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane 
and John Gardner (eds) Relating to Responsibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) 111 at 132: 
“Action is by its nature a gamble, [Honore] says: some you win, some you lose. Lacing liability 
when you lose is only half of the story of outcome responsibility; the other half includes all the 
positive normative consequences (admittedly mostly laid on extra-legally) that flow from doing 
what you do successfully”.
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of an extensionless point”.34 It is because, Gardner explains, “agency does have 
some reach and moral judgment does have some area of application” that our 
responsibility for wrongdoing is assessed with reference to the outcomes of our 
actions.35 In other words, if we aim to legally adjudge or morally appraise an 
agent, it is necessary for the judgment or appraisal to be about something. The 
something at issue is his or her conduct and impact on the world, and moreover, 
it is his or her conduct and impact which constitutes his or her agency. Otherwise, 
our point of scrutiny becomes “extensionless” or our judgment has no “area of 
application”.
We will nonetheless disagree about whether D should be held to be responsible 
(be held to account for) all the eventualities that follow from D’s conduct. We 
disagree because we have different boundary markers between the eventualities 
and consequences that are unfortunate and unlucky (and thereby beyond the 
appropriate scope of responsibility) and which eventualities and consequences 
that we ascribe to D’s conduct. The half-point is that this disagreement is a 
disagreement about the acceptable “baseline” of “responsibility” vis-a-vis 
“luck”.36 As discussed further below, the “baseline” or “boundary markers” 
of someone’s outcome responsibility will be informed by the moral norm 
that governs D’s conduct and renders D’s conduct as “wrongful”. The moral 
norm that governs D’s conduct will inform which outcomes we hold D to be 
responsible for.
The Woodhouse Report’s principled objections took issue with the fault 
principle’s objective assessment of wrongdoing and imposition of responsibility 
for outcomes. The two objections, I have suggested, are unfounded. In terms of 
the objective assessment of conduct, I have suggested that since “doing something 
wrongful” (breaching of duty) is distinct from “doing the wrong thing” (acting 
unjustifiably), “doing something wrongful” in breaching an objective standard 
of care does not engage questions of moral blameworthiness or censure. It is 
no criticism, therefore, to suggest that an objective standard of fault cannot be 
equated with moral wrongdoing. In terms of outcome responsibility, I have 
suggested that as a necessary feature of assessing conduct, “doing something 
wrongful” will attract responsibility for outcomes that are informed by factors 
beyond the wrongdoer’s control.
34 B Williams and T Nagel “Moral Luck” (1976) 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volumes 115 at 35: “If one cannot be responsible for consequences of one’s 
actions due to factors beyond one’s control, or for antecedents of one’s acts that are properties 
of temperament not subject to one’s will, or for the circumstances that pose one’s moral choices, 
then how can one be responsible even for the stripped-down acts of the will itself, if they are 
the product of antecedent circumstances outside of the will’s control? ... Everything seems to 
result from the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not 
within the agent’s control”.
35 John Gardner “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane and John Gardner 
(eds) Relating to Responsibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) 111 at 12B.
36 John Gardner “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane and John Gardner 
(eds) Relating to Responsibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) 111 at 127-8: “There can be 
no such thing as a coherent general objection to our being exposed to moral luck ... For what 
counts as luck is always, Nagel shows, luck only relative to some baseline or other ... The 
problem with a general objection to our exposure to moral luck is that everything we do is 
entirely a matter of luck relative to some baseline or other ... it follows that to object to moral 
luck tout court is to object to morality tout court.”
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The effect of a statutory scheme for no-fault compensation of personal injuries 
is to replace the fault principle with a principle of community responsibility. We 
can therefore begin to understand why D4 D. and D6 are treated different to Dp 
D2, and D, in New Zealand. P4, P. and P6 are compensated through a no-fault 
compensation scheme since their loss is a burden that the community has 
responsibility for. Cycling, surgery and home insulation are '‘risk-laden activities 
that exact a known and expected cost in life and limb” that are “undertaken for 
the convenience and utility of society”.37 Members of the community, through a 
compensation scheme, therefore “share in the burden” that fell upon P , P and 
P6.38 In comparison, the conduct of Dj, D2 and D, fell beyond the standard of 
conduct that we expect from journalists, insulators and drivers. Their conduct 
attracts an obligation to repair or correct the losses suffered by P , P, and P 
(without their conduct necessarily attracting moral censure).39 Moreover, as a 
necessary feature of “moral judgment having some area of application”,40 the 
scope of their obligations to repair the losses suffered by P , P2 and P may be 
determined by (fortunate or unfortunate) factors outside of their control.
We can now sharpen this contrast — between the fault principle and the 
principle of community responsibility — by first considering how the fault 
principle fits into the overarching principle of corrective justice, and then 
considering how a reconfiguration of “wrongful loss” renders the fault principle 
redundant.
3. The duty o f  reparation
In most jurisdictions, the remedial responses to our basic private law scenarios 
are structurally the same:
(1) Dj, and ’s newspaper, is required to print a retraction of the defamatory 
statement, and/or pay general damages to P( for P,'s loss of reputation.
(2) D2 is required to pay the costs of replacing the defective insulation and 
repairing any damage to the building to P2.
(3) D. is required to pay the costs of replacing P3’s bicycle.
(4) D4 is required to pay damages for the costs of reversing the sterilisation 
procedure, as well as for general damages for distress and loss of 
reproductive autonomy, to P4.
(5) D. is required to pay general damages to P. for the treatment of P .’s 
respiratory disease, associated injuries and distress.
(6) D6 is required to pay general damages to P6 for the injuries suffered 
following the collision.
The remedial response is the imposition of a duty of reparation. The structure 
of this remedial response is underscored by the principle of corrective justice. 
Corrective justice presupposes an equality between P and D (with regards to a
37 Owen Woodhouse “Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme” [1979] NZLJ 395 at 396.
38 Owen Woodhouse “Aspects of the Accident Compensation Scheme” [1979] NZLJ 395 at 396.
39 D N MacCormick “The Obligation of Reparation” (1978) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 175 at 183.
40 John Gardner “Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts” in Peter Cane and John Gardner 
(eds) Relating to Responsibility (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2001) 111 at 128.
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particular quality or pre-existing norm),41 the equality is displaced by a wrongful 
interaction or transaction between P and D, and corrective justice then requires 
the inequality to be “reversed, undone, counteracted”.42 Hence, D(’s retraction 
aims to reverse the effects of the defamatory statement about P,, D2’s payment 
enables P2 to correct the defects in her home, D3’s payment aims to replace P3’s 
bicycle, and so on. The performance of the duty of reparation is a rebalancing of 
the equality between P and D.
The imposition of the duty of reparation on D can be explained in terms of 
private law’s adherence to the principle of corrective justice. The imposition 
of this duty can be explained in a number of ways. Here I will outline the 
predominant explanations of the role of corrective justice that have been 
provided by Jules L Coleman, John Gardner and Ernest J Weinrib.
For Coleman, there are two norms that explain the duty of reparation: 
the elimination, rectification or annulment of wrongful or unjust losses (the 
annulment norm) and a “framework of rights and responsibilities between 
individuals” (the relational norm).43 According to Coleman, the relational norm 
provides “reasons for acting we have as a result of our actions”.44 It therefore 
brings D, and only D, into the remedial equation. The basis of the duty on D to 
repair the “wrong” therefore follows from the relational norm since it connects 
the wrongdoer (D) with the wronged-person (P).
However, the relational norm, by itself, “denies the nonnative relevance of 
wrongful losses”.45 The annulment norm then complements the relational norm 
as the annulment nonn “emphasizes the wrongful losses both as an aspect of 
corrective justice and as part of its point”.46 The content of the duty of reparation 
imposed on D is to rectify, annul or otherwise correct the wrongful losses 
suffered by P. The requirements of corrective justice are therefore a mixture of 
two “distinct duties” or nonns: the relational norm generates reasons for D to act 
on the basis of D’s wrongful actions and the annulment norm generates reasons 
for D to repair P’s wrongfully-occasioned losses.*1 The wrongful losses suffered 
by P, in the form of reputation loss, a damaged home, a damaged bicycle, bodily 
injury, respiratory illness, or loss of fertility, engage the annulment norm and 
generate reasons for why those losses should be eliminated, rectified or corrected. 
D’s wrongdoing — that is, wrongdoing with reference to a framework of rights
41 See EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 76: 
“Aristotle’s corrective justice presupposes the equality of the two parties to a transaction. The problem 
is: in what respect are the parties equal? This question is fundamental. Corrective justice serves a 
normative function: a transaction is required, on pain of rectification, to conform to its contours.”
42 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place o f Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) L& 
Phil 1 at 9.
43 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 435.
44 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 438.
45 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 438.
46 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 438.
47 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 441.
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and responsibilities — generates reasons for the journalist, insulator, driver and 
surgeon to perform the duty of reparation.
Here, in clearest terms through the lens of Coleman’s theory, we can view 
the two norms of objective duties and outcome responsibility coordinating to 
explain the principle of corrective justice. Singular focus on “the interaction 
between persons”,48 and the objective duties that ensue,49 denies the normative 
relevance of the losses caused. To recognise the normative relevance of the 
losses caused by D requires recognition that D is responsible for the outcome of 
D's wrongful conduct.50
For Gardner, the duty of reparation imposed on D can be explained 
with reference to a singular norm that can continue or persist beyond initial 
non-adherence to the norm. The relationship between D and P is governed 
by primary norms, such as P’s right to be secure from harm to their person, 
possessions, reputation, and so on. According to Gardner, whilst D’s wrongdoing 
violates these primary norms, “the obligation of reparation is grounded (comes 
into existence on the condition of and by reason of) this [primary] norm’s 
violation”.51 After non-adherence to the primary norm, it is still possible to adhere 
to some or all of the reasons for action that the primary norm was premised upon. 
We can therefore understand the duty of reparation as a continuation of such 
reasons for action. As Gardner succinctly explains:52
The normal reason why one has an obligation to pay for the losses that one
wrongfully occasioned ... is that this constitutes the best still-available
conformity with, or satisfaction of, the reasons why one had that obligation.
The erroneous note-taking, the use of defective insulation materials, the 
inattention whilst driving, are all actions that led to a breach of a primary 
obligation (or primary norm). The duty to repair the losses that follow from the 
violation of the primary obligation represent the “best still available” way of 
conforming with the reasons for action that contributed to the “obligatoriness” 
of the primary norm.53
Hence, even if we accept that the primary obligation is grounded “in terms 
of a [fair standard] as between” P and D,54 and is therefore an objective standard,
48 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 483.
49 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 492.
50 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 483: “personal responsibility and corrective justice are both 
different and incompatible. This is because personal responsibility focuses on an agent, 
typically the defendant in the legal context. To ask whether someone is personally responsible 
is to ask a question that focuses on that particular person. Corrective justice, on the other hand, 
focuses on the interaction between persons.”
51 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L & Phil 1 at 28.
52 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L & Phil 1 at 33-34.
53 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L&Phil 1 at 30.
54 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 491.
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the focus of the law shifts onto D insofar as the obligation of reparation is 
grounded in D’s violation of the primary obligation. It becomes conceptually 
consistent, therefore, to apply objective standards whilst still pursuing an 
outcome responsibility norm.55
Weinrib’s account of P’s entitlement to reparation has a similar structure. 
According to Weinrib’s theory of corrective justice:56
When the defendant ... breaches a duty correlative to the plaintiff’s right, the 
plaintiff is entitled to reparation. This remedy reflects that fact that even after the 
commission of the tort the defendant remains subject to the duty with respect to 
the plaintiff’s right. The defendant’s breach of the duty ... does not, of course, 
bring the duty to an end, for if it did, the duty would — absurdly — be discharged 
by its breach.
Central to this theory of corrective justice is the correlative relationship 
between P and D. For Weinrib, the Kantian “Right” — the “sum of conditions 
under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom” — governs the bilateral relationship 
between P and D.57 The “Right” provides (what is described above as) a primary 
norm. When D infringes the “Right”, or primary norm, D obtains a normative 
gain and P suffers a normative loss. The gains and losses are normative gains and 
losses since they are measured vis-a-vis the “Right” or primary norm. It follows 
for Weinrib that “the normative gain and the nonnative loss are correlative 
to each other”.58 This correlativity “locks the plaintiff and defendant into a 
reciprocal nonnative embrace” and “highlights the moral reason for singling 
out the defendant for liability”.59 It is because of this “reciprocal nonnative 
embrace” that, when the defendant violates the primary nonn, the defendant 
“violates a normative bond not with the world at large but specifically with the 
person to whom the defendant owed the duty”.60
The “sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with 
the choice of another” include a series of primary nonns that protect P, from the 
publication of untrue statements that lower Pj’s reputation, P2 from defective 
products being installed into P2’s buildings, P, from damage to her bicycle, P4 
from the loss of natural fertility, and so on. When D violates one of these primary 
norms, and causes a loss to be suffered by P, D “remains subject to” the primary 
norm and the discharge of the duty of reparation “rectifies both the normative 
gain and the normative loss in a singular bipolar operation”.61 This provides the 
abovementioned “baseline” or “boundary marker” for outcome responsibility. 
Whilst it is true that corrective justice “attributes no moral property to [D] in
55 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 484: “the personal responsibility theorist needs to show that, 
despite appearances, the objective standard is consistent with personal responsibility”.
56 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 135.
57 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 95.
58 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 136.
59 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 142-143.
60 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 143.
61 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 136.
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isolation” ,62 D is nonetheless morally responsible for the outcome of his or her 
wrongful conduct where the baseline or boundary marker for responsibility is 
understood in terms of the “reciprocal normative embrace. ” 63 In other words, the 
extent of D’s responsibility for his wrongful conduct is informed by the moral 
norm that governs D’s conduct and renders D’s conduct as “wrongful”.
Note how, according to these theories of corrective justice, the duty of 
reparation is (or at least appears to be) an agent-relative duty. That is, a duty 
that is grounded in reasons for action that only apply to D, as the wrongdoer. 
According to Coleman’s theory of corrective justice:64
Corrective justice imposes on wrongdoers the duty to repair the wrongful losses 
their conduct occasions. Thus, it provides wrongdoers with reasons for acting 
that are peculiar to injurers in an agent-relative sense-, to annul losses for which 
they are responsible.
It is the relational norm, you may recall, that provides “reasons for acting we 
have as a result of our actions” .65 The duty of reparation is therefore imposed on 
the wrongdoer qua their wrongdoing.
For Weinrib, the duty of reparation is also agent-relative. According to his 
theory, corrective justice necessitates a normatively-significant link between P 
and D. In essence, this is because the Kantian approach:66
... links the interacting parties through a right, on the one hand, and a 
corresponding duty, on the other. The right represents the moral position of the 
plaintiff; the duty represents the moral position of the defendant. Right and duty 
— and therefore plaintiff and defendant — are connected because the content of 
the right is the object of the duty.
Since corrective justice, in Weinrib’s theory, is concerned with normative 
gains and losses, the duty of reparation is imposed on D because of D’s normative 
gain. As discussed further below, D’s “gain” is not necessarily a factual gain (a 
material benefit). Rather, D’s “gain” is a normative gain in terms of transgression 
from a norm that governs the fair terms of D’s interaction with P.67 It is in this 
way that D’s normative gain is correlative with P’s normative loss.
The duty of reparation that is imposed on D is therefore an agent-relative duty 
on the basis that: D is locked into the “reciprocal normative embrace” through 
the strict correlativity of normative gains and normative losses (Weinrib), the 
reasons that apply to D to adhere to a primary norm continue to apply to D after 
D’s wrongdoing (Gardner), or, on the basis that the relational norm provides 
reasons for D to act as the result of D’s actions (Coleman). More generally,
62 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 492.
63 A Beever “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law” (2008) 28(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 475 at 479: “if a person is morally responsible for an outcome, then it 
is morally appropriate to insist that person be held accountable for that outcome.”
64 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 442 [emphasis added].
65 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 438.
66 EJ Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 123.
67 EJWeinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 115-116.
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the duty of reparation is imposed on D because of a “normatively significant 
connection between actions and their outcomes”.68
4. Relative and absolute wrongful loss
Consider some further facts in our basic private law scenarios:
(1) Another newspaper, that has a similar readership to D^s newspaper, 
corrects the untrue statement about P,.
(2) D,’s insurer pays the damages owed to P2 for the defective insulation.
(3) D3’s insurer pays the damages owed to P3 for the damaged bicycle.
(4) A government fund, generated through general and targeted taxation, 
pays for P4’s reversal of the sterilisation procedure.
(5) A government fund, generated through general and targeted taxation, 
pays for P5’s treatment and recovery.
(6) A government fund, generated through general and targeted taxation, 
pays for the treatment and recovery following P6’s injuries.
With the exception of the first scenario, we would generally accept that there 
is no injustice where a party, other than the wrongdoer, performs the duty of 
reparation that arises as a consequence of wrongdoing. That is, we would accept 
that third parties are able to discharge duties of reparation that, according to 
the previous section, at least appear to be duties that are agent-relative to the 
wrongdoer.
The first scenario is nonetheless distinct. This is because both the content and 
the basis of the duty of reparation are agent-relative. The reason why another 
newspaper or another newspaper columnist is unable to discharge the duty of 
reparation that follows the publication of a defamatory statement is because 
another newspaper or newspaper columnist is unable (or much less able) to 
annul, rectify or correct the loss suffered. Put in terms of Gardner’s framework, 
Dj printing a retraction of the defamatory statement is the “best still-available” 
means of “conformity with the reason why one had the obligation” not to 
defame P,. Or, in terms of Coleman’s framework, an agent-relative duty to print 
a retraction follows from the annulment norm since the retraction is the best way 
to annul or rectify the wrongful loss suffered by P,. Hence, the content of the 
duty is agent-relative: only D3 is able to undertake what is required to correct or 
annul the loss. In addition, the duty is also agent-relative in terms of the basis 
of the duty. That is (in terms of Coleman’s framework), the duty follows from 
the relational norm; a “framework of rights and responsibilities” that generates 
“reasons for acting we have as a result of our actions”. Or (in terms of Weinrib’s 
framework), P’s normative loss is correlative with D’s normative gain. The duty 
to retract the defamatory statement is agent-relative in the strictest sense, since 
both the content and basis of the duty is agent-relative.
In the remaining scenarios, the basis of the duty of reparation is agent-relative 
but the content of the duty is not necessarily agent-relative. In the second and third 
scenarios, D’s insurance company discharges the duty of reparation. With these 
circumstances in mind, Gardner suggests that the principle of corrective justice 
is not limited to regulating “the actions of the person from whom the transfer is 
to be made back”, but rather, the principle can govern “another person acting
68 SR Perry “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 449 at 497.
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on behalf of that person"’.69 Hence, in scenarios 2 and 3, D's insurance company 
acts on behalf of D when the company compensates P. Gardner suggests that it is 
possible for an agent to act on behalf of another, such that the wrongdoer can be 
regarded as having adhered to the norms of corrective justice even though it was 
the agent that provided compensation. Such vicarious agency ‘"depends on the 
existence of norms that empower one agent... to act in the name of another”.70 
The duty of reparation is still discharged “in the name o f ’ D since the existence 
(or basis) of the duty is owed to D’s wrongdoing. How the content of the duty 
is discharged is not, in comparison, agent-relative since a third party (in these 
scenarios) is able to pay the damages that correct, rectify or annul P’s loss.
The fourth, fifth and sixth scenarios represent a departure from the corrective 
justice principle in favour of a principle of distributive justice. To understand 
this transition, Coleman asks us to “distinguish between the grounds of the duty 
and the institutional mechanisms that are permissible ways of implementing the 
duty.”71 That is, we should differentiate (just as we have been doing) between the 
basis and the content of the duty. In terms of the grounds (or bases) of the duty, a 
“victim’s wrongful loss may give her a right to recover.”72 Her wrongful loss and 
right to recover, as we know, “is part of the normative basis for imposing a duty 
to repair.”73 However, the “nature and scope of the duty depends on the practices 
in place” for implementing the duty.74 Although for Coleman “corrective justice 
links agents with losses” and “provides individuals agent-relative reasons for 
acting”, such agent-relative reasons for action may be “superseded by other 
practices that create reasons for activity ... such practices sever the relationship 
between agents and losses”.75
Hence, in scenarios 4, 5, and 6, “if [P] recovers from treasury, [P] no longer 
has a moral right to recover from [D]” since “whether or not corrective justice 
in fact imposes moral duties on particular individuals is conditional upon the 
existence of other institutions for making good victims’ claims to repair”.76 The 
existence of a compensation scheme within a community pre-empts P’s claim 
against D that would otherwise be based on the principle of corrective justice. 
Hence, where a comprehensive compensation scheme is in place, “corrective 
justice itself imposes no duties” within that community.77 The existence of the 
scheme therefore severs the basis of the duty of reparation.
69 John Gardner “What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice” (2011) 30(1) 
L & Phil 1 at 10.
70 John Gardner “Some Types of Law” in D Edlin (ed) Common Law Theory (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 51 at 58.
71 JL Coleman “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 427 
at 443: “Even if the injurer has the duty to repair injustice, it does not follow that justice 
requires that the duty be discharged by the injurer. We need to distinguish between the grounds 
of the duty and the institutional mechanism that are permissible ways of implementing the 
duty.”
72 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 403.
73 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 403.
74 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 403.
75 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 403.
76 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 402.
77 JL Coleman Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992) at 403.
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Similarly, for Weinrib, if the law adopts “compensatory goals” then such 
goals “cannot fit within” corrective justice.78 “Because compensation reposes its 
justificatory force solely on the plaintiff’s exigence in the aftermath of injury”, 
Weinrib explains, “it applies to the plaintiff independently of the defendant”.79 
It follows that there is no “bilateral” link between the injured and the injurer 
and the need for compensation “relates to the injured party to others (however 
many there are) who are similarly exigent and thus have similar claims as a 
matter of distributive justice”.80 In other words, if P’s wrongful loss is no longer 
necessarily tied to D’s wrongdoing, then P’s loss (and all other similar losses) are 
burdens that require just distribution. Once isolated from D’s .wrongdoing, the 
significance of P’s losses only raise questions of distributive justice.
The existence or basis of the duty of reparation that is imposed on D therefore 
depends on how we conceptualise and configure P’s loss. As mentioned, 
Weinrib’s theory is concerned with “normative” gains and losses (as compared 
with “factual” gains and losses). “The factual aspect of a gain and loss”, Weinrib 
explains, “refers to the effect of the interaction on the amount of condition of 
one’s holdings”.81 For instance, a bodily injury that is occasioned without fault 
(innocently) represents a factual loss; the pain, suffering or disability is a material 
impairment to the person.82 A normative loss, in comparison, is measured as 
against a norm that “set the terms of a fair interaction”.83 In normative terms, 
a bodily injury that is occasioned innocently (in adherence to the terms of fair 
interaction) renders neither a normative loss nor normative gain, whereas a 
bodily injury that is occasioned negligently (in contravention of the terms of fair 
interaction) renders a normative gain and a normative loss.
Note how Weinrib introduces agent-relative considerations into his account 
of “loss”: loss should be measured with reference to a norm, and that norm 
ought to govern the terms of fair interaction between two people. In other words, 
Weinrib’s notion of wrongful loss is a relative notion of loss: the particular 
loss ought to be “regarded as wrongful vis-a-vis the injurer whose wrong or 
wrongdoing caused it”.84
It is also necessary, Perry argues, to interpret Coleman’s theory in the same 
manner.85 Recall that the annulment norm requires the elimination, rectification 
or annulment of wrongful “losses”. “For the purposes of grounding a duty 
of repair”, Perry suggests that the “loss” that requires annulment ought to be 
“characterised as wrongful with reference to a particular wrongdoing that
78 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 121.
79 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 121.
80 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 121.
81 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f  Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 115.
82 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 116.
83 EJ Weinrib The Idea o f Private Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 115-116.
84 SR Perry “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 917 
at 922.
85 SR Perry “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 917 
at 922: “If  casual agency constituted a sufficient basis for a duty to repair a wrongful loss, the 
wrongfulness o f  which was completely unconnected with the nature of the agent’s conduct, 
why would it not ground a duty whether the loss was ‘wrongful’ or not?”.
142 New Zealand Universities Law Review Vol 27
causally contributed to it”.86 Hence, the “loss” that Coleman’s annulment norm 
is concerned with — and ultimately the loss that corrective justice is concerned 
with — is a normative loss that is wrongful vis-a-vis D's wrongdoing. It is this 
relativist conception of wrongful loss that is ultimately the basis of agent-relative 
duties of reparation under the principle of corrective justice. Since corrective 
justice presupposes an equality between P and D (with regards to a particular 
quality or pre-existing norm), an inequality between P and D -— that calls for 
correction — only arises if the wrongfulness of the loss that is suffered by P is 
somehow related to D.
The alternative conception of wrongful loss is an absolute conception; that 
a particular loss is “wrongful tout court” or “wrongful vis-a-vis the world at 
large”.87 If we view P4’s medical misadventure, P.'s respiratory disease, and P6’s 
cycling collision as each involving a “wrongful loss” where the “wrongfulness” 
of the loss is detennined by a norm that is isolated from D,’s, D.’s and D,’s 
causal contribution to the loss, then we can begin to unlock tort law’s 
“reciprocal normative embrace”. That is the effect of the Woodhouse Report’s 
"double argument” (or any sound argument) under the umbrella of community 
responsibility: the loss suffered by P is wrongful as measured against a standard 
that is independent of D (such as norms of reciprocity, risk-distribution and 
equity). It then follows that the fault principle is inapplicable. In particular, the 
components of the fault principle, such as an objective assessment of D's conduct 
and D’s responsibility for the outcome of D’s conduct, become irrelevant to the 
remedial response to absolute wrongful loss. Moreover, once the fault principle 
is rendered irrelevant, the broader notions of corrective justice begin to “hold no 
sway”.88
Given that the fault principle is a sound evaluative standard, which has been 
displaced by the reconfiguration of wrongful loss, it is tempting to engraft the 
fault principle onto principles of justice other than the principle of corrective 
justice. For instance, since fault is concerned with wrongdoing, it may be 
tempting to engraft the fault principle onto the principle of retributive justice. 
Yet, we can readily anticipate a problem. In order to engage a principle of 
retribution it is necessary to find that the conduct was not only wrongful (breach 
of an objective duty) but also the wrong thing to do (an unjustifiable act). This is 
because the principle of retribution, which aims to impose a loss or burden on D 
that is proportionate to D's blameworthy conduct, ought to only apply where the 
conduct attracts moral censure. A further finding, beyond objectively-assessed 
fault, is therefore required in order identify when D's wrongdoing also amounts 
to blameworthy conduct. Often, the additional finding will require inquiry into 
the subjective aspects of D’s conduct, beyond objective questions of care and 
attention and into subjective questions of recklessness, wilful blindness, and so 
on. In such instances, the remedial response has moved beyond the remit of the 
fault principle and into questions of culpability.
86 SR Perry “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 917 
at 923.
87 SR Perry “The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice” (1992) 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 917 
at 922.
88 G Palmer “New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty Years On” (1994) 44 
UTLJ 223 at 247.
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It is also tempting to engraft the fault principle onto the principle of 
distributive justice. For instance, a compensation scheme may require that 
the community shares the responsibility for the costs of personal injury whilst 
allocating the proportion of responsibility in a way that those who cause the 
personal injuries bear a larger share of the cost. However, care needs to taken 
as to what is meant by “cause” in this context. On one reading, those who are 
engaged in risk-laden activities, such as drivers, surgeons and home insulators, 
collectively cause personal injuries, and therefore ought to bear a larger share of 
the costs. On a slightly more strict reading, particular individuals, such as D4, D. 
and D6, may be causally responsible for personal injuries, and therefore ought 
to bear a larger share of the costs. On either reading, to “causally contribute 
to a loss” is still distinct from a loss “being wrongfully occasioned”. The fault 
principle, after all, is concerned with fault. Absent a finding of fault, the fault 
principle is not engaged in this context.
Perhaps then a compensation scheme could require that the community 
shares the responsibility for the costs of personal injuries (however occasioned) 
whilst allocating the proportions of responsibility in a way that those who 
wrongfully-occasioned personal injuries bear a larger share of the cost. Under 
such a scheme, Waldron observes, “the nexus between causation and liability is 
not regarded as essential; it just happens to be the method we have adopted for 
ensuring that those who expose others to risks are exposed to substantially the 
same risk themselves”.89 D’s fault may therefore be one criterion, among other 
criteria, for determining the just distribution of costs associated with personal 
injuries between a number of potential cost-bearers. Yet, whilst the scheme is 
concerned with distributing proportions of the overall cost, the fault principle is 
still not engaged in this context. This is because D is still not held to be responsible 
for the outcome of his wrongful conduct, and hence, the component of outcome 
responsibility remains absent. As we know, outcome responsibility can require D 
to account for massive losses that follow from D’s wrongdoing. The requirement 
to account for such massive losses cannot be justified as adhering to a sound 
principle of distributive justice.
The principle of community responsibility forces a reconfiguration of 
“wrongful loss” so that the loss that a person suffers following a personal injury 
is wrongful vis-a-vis the community-at-large. Although there may be sound 
reasons for this reconfiguration, it is at the expense of the fault principle. We 
therefore abandon the fault principle in this reconfiguration, and abandon the 
evaluative components of the fault principle: the objective assessment of conduct 
and the imposition of responsibility for outcomes. The fault principle, and the 
component evaluative standards, cannot be engrafted onto the application of 
the principles of retributive or distributive justice: the evaluative standards are 
irretrievably inapplicable.
5. Conclusion
I stated that the purpose of this discussion is to identify how the provision of a 
no-fault compensation scheme for personal injuries has displaced the principle of 
corrective justice. My simplistic answer is that the principle of corrective justice 
has been displaced through a reconfiguration of the “wrongfulness” of personal
89 Jeremy Waldron “Moments o f Carelessness and Massive Loss” in David G Owen (ed) The 
Philosophical Foundations o f  Tort Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 387 at 407.
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injuries. Once a personal injury is no longer viewed as a loss that is wrongful 
vis-a-vis its wrongful cause, the wrongdoer’s conduct and his responsibility for 
the outcome of his conduct become irrelevant (and remains irrelevant) to the 
remedial response to wrongfully-occasioned personal injuries. The point is that 
this reconfiguration, motivated by the principle of community responsibility, 
is at the expense of the fault principle, and more broadly, at the expense of 
the nonnative connection between actions and outcomes.90 This is what is 
“abandoned” through the introduction of a no-fault compensation scheme for 
personal injury.
90 SR Perry “The Moral Foundations of Tort Law” (1992) 77 Iowa Law Rev 449 at 497.
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